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Contingency management is an effective treatment for drug addiction. The current
explanation for its success is rooted in alternative reinforcement theory. We suggest
that alternative reinforcement theory is inadequate to explain the success of contingency
management and produce a model based on demand curves that show how little the
monetary rewards offered in this treatment would affect drug use. Instead, we offer an
explanation of its success based on the concept that it accesses deliberative decision-
making processes. We suggest that contingency management is effective because it
offers a concrete and immediate alternative to using drugs, which engages deliberative
processes, improves the ability of those deliberative processes to attend to non-drug
options, and offsets more automatic action-selection systems. This theory makes explicit
predictions that can be tested, suggests which users will be most helped by contingency
management, and suggests improvements in its implementation.
Keywords: decision-making, deliberation, addiction, contingency management, neuroeconomics, impulsivity,
addiction treatment
1. Contingency Management
Contingency management is a method of driving behavioral change through reinforcement with
tangible rewards (1). It has been shown to significantly reduce drug-using behavior and increase
continuous abstinence rates (2–9).
There are two main variations of contingency management, voucher-based and prize-based.
In voucher-based treatment, patients are awarded points that accumulate for submission of drug-
negative urine samples (3–5, 8). These points start out very low and can be exchanged for merchan-
dise at any time. For example, in the Higgins et al. (5) study, points for the first clean sample were
worth $2.50 and each subsequent sample was worth $1.50 more. By the end of the first month, a
drug-negative sample was worth $16.50.
In prize-based treatment, patients earn a chance to win a prize with each drug-negative sample
(1, 9–12). Typically, in these studies, prizes were worth around $1, $5, $20, and $100, and the
probability to win higher-valued prizes was lower than lower-valued prizes (0.4% for a $100 prize
and 68% for a $1 prize). Overall, the chance of the drug-negative sample having a monetary value of
anything over a dollar was <7%.
2. Current Theories: Alternative Reinforcement
The success of contingency management is thought to be primarily due to the reinforcing
properties of an alternative reward that is offered to patients for remaining abstinent (1, 5).
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FIGURE 1 | The canonical structure of a demand curve. Pmax is the
point at which elasticity E= 1, and the elasticity transitions from inelastic
(|E|<1) to elastic (|E|>1).
The conceptualization of contingency management is that drug
consumption is much like any other consumption of goods, and
thus that increasing the cost of drugs should decrease use. Contin-
gency management increases the cost of drugs because it creates
an opportunity cost that is lost (the alternative reinforcer) when
the user takes drugs. Reasoning for this is based on operant con-
ditioning theories, noting that targeted behaviors increase with
reinforcement and decrease in the presence of substitutes (13–16).
In economic terms, this change in use with cost can be mea-
sured as elasticity, which can be quantitatively defined as the
change in the number of choices selected as cost increases (17–21).
To determine this, one can measure the amount of effort an agent
is willing to expend in order to gain the reward as a function of
the cost. The function that results is called the demand curve (see
Figure 1). A commodity that decreases quickly with cost is said
to be “highly elastic,” while a commodity that decreases slowly
with cost is said to be “inelastic.” (See Table 1 for definitions of
the behavioral/neuroeconomic concepts used in this article.)
Quantitatively, the effectiveness of an alternative reinforcement
depends on the elasticity of the drug that the alternative rein-
forcer is substituting for. Although early descriptions of drug use
assumed that drugs were taken irrespective of cost, Becker and
Murphy (17) pointed out that drugs were economic objects, and,
as such, should show elasticity.While there are theoretical reasons
to expect differences in the elasticity between drugs and natural
rewards (17, 22), nevertheless, drugs do show elasticity both in
non-human animals (23–27) and in humans (28–32). This means
that increasing the cost (or increasing the size of the alternate
options, which increases the opportunity cost) of taking the drug
should decrease use.Alternative reinforcement theory predicts that
the change in drug use from contingency management should be
proportional to the elasticity of drug use.
As reviewed above, contingency management provides rela-
tively low-value monetary rewards for abstinence (especially in
the first month of treatment). For example, in voucher-based
contingency management, rewards are as low as $2.50 for the very
TABLE 1 | Economic theoretical constructs used in this article.
 Agent: a decision-maker, whether it be human or non-human animal or a
computer algorithm
 Deliberation: deciding between multiple options based on a search-and-
evaluation process in which the two options are considered and compared.
Deliberation depends fundamentally on the ability to imagine future outcomes
 Demand curve: a quantitative measure of elasticity, measuring the amount of
an option selected as a function of the cost. Typical demand curves have an
inelastic section, which transitions non-linearly to a highly elastic section as cost
increases
 Elasticity: the idea that as costs increases, the selection of an economic object
decreases. A thing that decreases quickly with cost is said to be “highly elastic,”
while a thing that decreases slowly with cost is said to be “inelastic”
 Opportunity cost: alternative rewards lost by selecting a given option
(selecting the given option removes the opportunity to select the alternative; the
more valuable the alternative, the larger the opportunity cost)
 Preference reversal: a phenomenon in which the agent prefers one delayed
choice over another delayed choice when they are both far in the future, but
switches to prefer the second choice when that second choice becomes more
immediate
 Value: the idea that a given option has an underlying utility for an agent.
However, value has to be measured, for example, by a willingness-to-pay or by
revealed preference
 Willingness to pay: a measure of the valuation of an object as a function of
the amount of money or effort an agent is willing to put into achieving it
 Revealed preference: a measure of valuation of an object as a function of
whether it is preferred or not when given in contrast to another option
Experiments find these measures can produce incompatible outcomes.
first negative urine sample and $16.25 for a negative sample after
remaining abstinent the entire first month (5). The pre-clinical
experiments suggest that the value of alternative reinforcement
rewards used in contingencymanagement should not reduce drug
consumption as much as it does. The pre-clinical experiments
suggest that either cost of the drug or magnitude of the reinforcer
would need to be significantly higher thanwhat is typically used in
contingency management if alternative reinforcement alone were
to account for the observed reductions of drug use in contingency
management studies.
3. The Problem with the Alternative
Reinforcement Theory
If we assume that drugs are economic objects, and thus are subject
to change in demand or price, then one way to quantitatively
measure level of consumption as a function of price is with a
demand curve. The demand curve measures a fundamental con-
cept of consumption: as price of the economic object increases, the
consumption of that object will decrease (33, 34).
Figure 1 shows the structure of a typical demand curve. These
curves can be well-fit with Eq. 1 measuring the relationship of
the cost of some commodity (C) and the consumption of that
commodity (Q) (35):
Q = LCb   e aC (1)
where Lmeasures consumption at C= 1, and b and a are variables
that relate to slope and acceleration of the slope, respectively. The
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slope of the curve predicts the elasticity of the commodity.
E = b  aC (2)
Pmax is the point at which the elasticity E= 1, which is the point
at which elasticity transitions from <1 unit of decreased use per
unit of increased cost (inelastic) to more than 1 unit of decreased
use per unit of increased cost (highly elastic). Because the elasticity
terms a, b, and the cost C appear in the exponents in Eq. 1,
once the cost crosses Pmax [when C> (b+ 1)/a)], consumption
drops off very quickly. Using demand curves, we can construct a
quantitative model to determine how monetary rewards should
affect consumption of a drug. As mentioned previously, mon-
etary values early in treatment are relatively low, and demand
curve modeling suggests that these rewards alone would affect
consumption of the drugs very little.
3.1. Modeling Contingency Management: The
Monetary Value of Vouchers Early in Contingency
Management Treatment Should have a Negligible
Effect on the Consumption of Cocaine
Bruner and Johnson (21) constructed demand curves for indi-
viduals that regularly use cocaine by asking subjects how much
cocaine they would buy as the cost increased. As noted above,
providing alternative rewards increases the cost of the commodity
(here the drug) through lost opportunities (an opportunity cost) –
if the person takes the drug, then they do not get the alternative
reward. This means that we can use these demand curves to
predict how this opportunity cost should change the choicesmade.
Individuals in treatment get a voucher value of $2.50 the first
time they provide a clean sample1. Using the assumption that
individuals seeking treatment spend an average of $99/day (Petry,
personal communication) during a typical day of cocaine use, and
given that 1 unit of reward in the Bruner and Johnson (21) data
was worth $5 on the street, a starting contingency management
reward value of $2.50/day is worth approximately $0.13/unit.
A shift of $0.13/unit on the demand curve would be predicted
to produce a negligible effect on cocaine consumption [the Bruner
and Johnson (21) demand curve predicts a 1.6% change]. Even at
the end of the first month of contingency management treatment,
when patients receive a voucher worth $16.25 ($0.82/unit), there
should be little change in consumption [the Bruner and Johnson
(21) demand curve predicts a 17% change].
In order to quantitatively measure whether these economic
changes could explain contingency management’s effects, we took
the effect sizes reviewed in the meta-analysis by Lussier et al.
(36) and asked how much the Bruner and Johnson (21) demand
curve would predict from the economic change in cost alone. Of
course, patients seeking treatment have increased costs for drug
use due to many factors beyond the simple loss of the contingent
alternate reward. Similarly, there is a large variability in how
contingency management studies are run and what additional
1In the Higgins et al. (5) study, subjects got a voucher worth $2.50 for the first clean
sample. Taking this voucher as covering staying abstinent formore than 1 daywould
only decrease the predicted impact of the voucher. Since our analysis will show that
voucher size is inadequate to drive changes in the demand curve, any increased
required abstinence will not change our conclusions.
FIGURE 2 | Predicted and observed effect sizes of contingency
management processes. From the meta-analysis by Lussier et al. (36), we
calculated the expected change in demand by applying the contingent
alternate reward (in $) to the average demand curve found by Bruner and
Johnson (21). This gave a predicted effect size, which was dramatically less
than the typical effects observed. See text for additional discussion.
treatments they are paired with. Finally, the Bruner and Johnson
(21) analysis is from one set of cocaine addicts, while the studies
reviewed by Lussier et al. (36) range from alcoholics to stimulant
addicts. Nevertheless, 21/27 studies had predicted changes less
than the observed effect size, and the median ratio was that
the predicted effect was less than half the observed (median
ratio= 0.43). Figure 2 shows the distribution of observed effect
sizes against the economically predicted changes. The predicted
changes are significantly less than the observed changes (matched
pairs median test, p= 0.00008).
This analysis suggests that the simple economic description
of contingency management is inadequate – the rewards offered
in contingency management are too small to have the observed
effects. We suggest that this is because the microeconomic model
on which the economic explanation for contingency management
is based is inadequate – human decision-making depends onmore
than simple cost-benefit analyses. Instead, the human decision-
making process is better described as an interaction between
multiple competing components (37–43), each of which uses
different processes to combine reward information (value) with
past experiences (memory) to select actions (make decisions). We
suggest that contingency management taps into certain aspects of
these multiple decision-making systems to drive behavior to be
more likely to reject the drug-taking choice.
4. Valuation
Early psychological and economic research postulated that rein-
forcers are transituational, meaning that the efficacy of the rein-
forcer remains consistent across different experimental conditions
(44–46). However, studies have shown that reinforcers do not
consistently elicit reliable behavioral outputs in different con-
texts (47).
In the fields of behavioral and neuroeconomics, decisions are
assumed to derive from an underlying “value” or “utility” placed
on outcomes. However, this value cannot be directly observed
experimentally, and thus must be interpreted from experimental
conditions. The two primary methods for deriving this value are
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willingness to pay experiments, in which an agent is given an
opportunity to pay a cost for an outcome, and revealed preference
experiments, in which an agent is given a choice between two or
more options. In willingness-to-pay experiments, the agent has to
decide whether to continue to pursue a given option or not. In
revealed-preference experiments, the agent has to decide which
option to pursue. Importantly, experiments in rats, monkeys, and
humans all find differences between how animals value options
under these two measurements, often finding incompatible out-
comes (43, 47–49). Thus, converting experiments from single
option (Go or don’t?) to multiple option (Which one?) can change
how animals appear to value a given option.
A typical willingness-to-pay experiment would be the break-
point procedure, in which an animal presses a lever to receive
reward. The first reward is delivered with only a single-lever
press, but the second requires two-lever presses, the third requires
four, the fourth eight, and so on, doubling each time. At some
point, the cost becomes too high and the animal stops press-
ing the lever (48, 50–52). In humans, willingness-to-pay can be
assessed by simply asking “how much would you pay for this
outcome?” (47).
By contrast, a typical revealed-preference experiment would
provide an animal two levers, one of which provides one type
of reward (A), while the other provides another type of reward
(B) (48, 52, 53). The animal is only able to select one lever
at any given time and thus must choose between the separate
options. The implication is that the selected option is more valu-
able than the non-selected option. In humans, revealed pref-
erence can be assessed by asking “which option would you
prefer?” (47).
Extensive evidence exists within the behavioral and neuroeco-
nomics literature that these two measures can produce incom-
patible valuations, in which human subjects may be willing to
pay more for option A than for option B, even when they would
prefer to take option B when faced with the two options together
(47). Recently, Ahmed (48) found in self-administering rats that
measuring value bymeans of a breakpoint procedure (willingness-
to-pay) can produce different ordering than when measuring
value by means of a choice procedure (revealed preference); that
is, subjects were willing to pay more for drug than saccharin
but preferred saccharin to drug when given the choice (48). This
strongly suggests that value is not an intrinsic (transituational)
property, but is highly dependent on the contextual surrounding
components.
These analyses implies that single-option experiments, in
which an agent is tasked with deciding whether to pursue a given
object or not may access different process than multiple-option
experiments, in which an agent is tasked with deciding which
option to pursue.
4.1. Valuation Inconsistencies Arise from
Multiple Decision-Making Systems
Current theories suggest that this underlying lack of transsitua-
tionality arises because animals (including humans) make deci-
sions based on several incompatible decision-making systems,
each of which processes information about the decision in fun-
damentally different ways. Because these different systems drive
behavior at different times, the same agent can show different
valuations under different experimental conditions.
Classically, the idea that valuation is inconsistent and not
transsituational has been addressed in terms of dual-process theo-
ries that humans (and presumably other animals as well) have two
separable components of decision-making, one which is impul-
sive and depends on reacting to immediate, concrete rewards,
and another which is more rational and capable of waiting for
larger, more abstract rewards (54–57). Importantly, the impulsive
(often called “reactive”) system is not necessarily always chasing
positive rewards; it can also avoid negative consequences (58),
nevertheless, the key difference in the two dual-process hypothesis
is that the impulsive system attends to immediate consequences
while the other (cognitive, often called “reflective”) system takes
into account farther future consequences (59–62). In many of
these discussions, the impulsive system is identified as more
“emotional” and more related to an animal’s history, while the
rational system is identified with more cognitive processing. In
many of these theories, the rational system is assumed to be a self-
control system, which inhibits the activity of the impulsive system
(63–65), often referred to as a form of “self-control” (66, 67). This
theory has a very long history (68–70) and there are good sum-
maries of the modern perspectives on this dichotomy (40, 59, 63,
65, 67, 71). Anatomically, the impulsive system is associated with
the nucleus accumbens and amygdala, while the rational system is
associated with the prefrontal cortex (54, 56, 57, 59, 72, 73).
Recent computational work examining how agents process
information tomake a decision (such as taking a drug or not) sug-
gests that multiple action-selection systems compete and interact
to produce that decision. Current theories suggest that decisions
arise from as many as four separable systems, each depending
on different information-processing computations (37, 42, 43,
74–77). Each system uses past experience differently and pro-
cesses information about the world differently, and thus each has
advantages and disadvantages in different situations. An agent
that correctly identifies the best action-selection system to use
in a given situation will outperform a different agent that does
not. Because different systems drive behavior at different times,
valuation is not necessarily self-consistent.
Following these recent taxonomies (43), we identify four
decision-making systems each of which selects actions through a
different computation: (1) reflexes, in which evolutionarily useful
stimulus–response pairs are hard-wired within a neural system
(78, 79), (2) Pavlovian actions, in which an animal learns when to
release a species-specific behavior (80–82), (3) procedural actions,
in which arbitrary action chains are stored and released on cue
(83, 84), and (4) deliberation, which entails a slow, goal-oriented
search and evaluate process (42, 85–87). Each of these systems is
instantiated in a different anatomical network – reflexes in spinal
cord and brainstem (88), Pavlovian actions with amygdala and
the periaqueductal gray (89, 90), procedural with motor cortex,
cerebellum, and the basal ganglia (91–93), and deliberation with
hippocampus and the prefrontal cortex (87, 94–96).
There are many similarities between the dual-process andmul-
tiple decision-making systems theories, particularly in the separa-
tion between more automatic and more cognitive systems (40, 43,
65). Both theories, for example, suggest that stress and cognitive
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org June 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 764
Regier and Redish Contingency management and deliberative decision-making processes
load will disrupt the more cognitive systems, shifting behavior
to more automatic systems. Both theories suggest that the more
automatic systems tend to react to more immediate stimuli, while
themore cognitive system is capable of incorporating information
that is not immediately present.
However, there are important differences between the theories.
For example, the information-processing theories do not imply
that the more automatic systems are more impulsive, as hypoth-
esized by the classical dual-process distinction. For example, a
fire chief with extensive expertise is using a fast, non-deliberative
process to make the right choice (83); no one would argue that a
fire chief is making an impulsive choice. The more recent models
have shown that intuition and developed expertise arises from
a different computational process than emotion, suggesting that
these are different systems (43). Additionally, the information-
processing theory provides for interacting components that can
make cognitive systems react differently in the face of concrete
stimuli (97, 98).
In addition, the hypothesized causes of addictive behavior is
different in the two theories, which has implications for how
contingency management should be used and what modifica-
tions would do to its success. These subtle differences between
these theories make different predictions and change some of
the implications of our fundamental hypothesis (that contingency
management accesses deliberative processes, see below). We will
address the differences between these theories below, but first we
address the main implications of our hypothesis that contingency
management accesses deliberative processes, which are similar
under the two theories.
5. Hypothesis: Contingency Management
Accesses Deliberative Systems
Our hypothesis is that the provision of a concrete, identified, alter-
native reward in contingency management both engages delib-
erative processes and improves the ability of those deliberative
processes to attend to non-drug options. In a sense, contin-
gency management transitions the drug-valuation process from a
willingness-to-pay condition to a revealed-preference condition.
In addition, we propose that the concrete and more immediate
rewards provided by contingencymanagement increase the ability
of deliberative systems to attend, value, and select the alternative
(non-drug) reward. (Thismay bewhy the prize-basedCMsystems
aremore effectivewith lower value rewards than comparablymore
expensive monetary-based voucher systems.)
5.1. Pre-Clinical Experimental Support for this
Hypothesis
Non-human animal self-administration studies have also found
that drugs are economic objects and show a non-zero elasticity.
As with human studies, increasing the cost (measured in terms
of number of lever presses required to receive drug) decreases
the number of self-administered drug-taking events (28, 99–101).
Similarly, providing an alternative reinforcer reduces the amount
of drug self-administration in both rats and monkeys (23–25,
27, 48, 53, 100, 102–106). These studies fall into two categories,
which require dramatically different levels of alternative reward
to decrease drug use.
Classically, the simplest measure of the cost-dependence of
drug self-administration in non-human animals is the breakpoint
analysis (52, 99). These studies find that much larger costs are
required before an animal will cease drug self-administration than
before an animal will cease taking non-drug rewards (51, 100).
This suggests that it would require very large non-drug rewards
to counteract drug self-administration. The first set of studies
(24, 25, 27, 104) confirmed this hypothesis, in that they used
single-response conditions and found that reductions in drug
self-administration were only observed after very large alterna-
tive rewards. For example, Woolverton et al. (27) found that the
opportunity cost of the drug option needed to be increased 100-
fold (for low-drug concentrations) to 1000-fold (for average and
high-drug concentrations) in order to significantly reduce self-
administration. In these studies, animals could switch between
conditions that either provided cocaine on pressing the primary
lever or alternative reward on pressing the same primary lever.
In other words, the animal could switch between situations that
enabled non-deliberative processes. Other studies using similar
techniques have found similar proportions (24, 25, 107, 108).
Interestingly, Ahmed [(48), see Ref. (100, 105, 106)] found
much smaller alternatives could reduce drug self-administration.
In these studies, the animals had two options directly available
to them on opposite sides of the chamber – one lever pro-
vided cocaine, while the other provided saccharin. Preference was
measured by whether the animals selected the saccharin lever
or the cocaine lever. These studies also examined single-option
breakpoints, in which only one lever was provided and cost was
measured as the number of lever presses required before the
animal gave up. These studies found that although the break-
points for cocaine were much higher than the breakpoints for
saccharin, animals preferred saccharin when provided with a
revealed-preference two-lever choice paradigm. Similarly, LeSage
(53) showed that providing a small amount of sucrose for not
self-administering nicotine was sufficient to reduce the number
of nicotine responses.
These studies support the proposed dichotomy between
willingness-to-pay valuations (measured by single-lever
breakpoint studies and situation-change studies, theoretically
dependent on non-deliberative processes) and revealed-
preference valuations (measured as forced choices between two
explicit levers). The revealed-preference studies required much
smaller rewards to decrease drug self-administration than the
willingness-to-pay studies. The difference in size of alternate
reward required to change behavior under the two paradigms
suggests that the difference lies in fundamental processes
underlying decision-making across multiple species (including at
least rats, monkeys, and humans).
6. Components of Contingency
Management that Affect Deliberation
The information processing that underlies deliberative decision-
making processes is now beginning to be elucidated (87, 98, 109),
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particularly, in contrast to other decision-making systems (39,
43, 110). Deliberation requires recognition of a situation, a serial
consideration of the potential actions available, and evaluation
and comparison of those potential options (42, 87).
The main advantage of deliberation is that because these
expected consequences are represented during the decision pro-
cess, they can be evaluated during that process, in the context
of the agent’s current goals (86). This means that the individ-
ual options must be found (85, 98, 111, 112) and then the val-
uation constructed (40, 47, 73, 113). Both the search process
and the construction of value will be modulated by processes
that computationally affect neural information processing (98,
114). Examples of these include working memory abilities (57,
115), whether the consequence is phrased as a win or a loss
(40, 47, 116, 117), attention (113, 118), emotional state (119),
surrounding options (120), and even the presence of unre-
lated numbers, such as in anchoring [where unrelated anchors
such as one’s social security number can be used to change
one’s expected cost and thus one’s willingness to pay for a
reward (40, 47, 117, 118)].
The deliberative process is slow and computationally inten-
sive, likely because of the cumbersome memory-retrieval and
imagination-construction system needed to calculate the possible
outcomes in order to evaluate them (83, 87, 98, 112). The eval-
uation achieved through deliberation depends on a number of
stimulus factors, including the expected delay to the reward (121),
and the concreteness of the reward (97).Deliberation also depends
on a number of internal factors, such as one’s perceived needs and
desires (86, 119), as well as one’s cognitive and executive-function
abilities (98), such as episodic future thinking (95, 96), working
memory (115, 122), and ability to hold attention (123, 124).
Valuation derived from deliberation depends on a direct imag-
ination of expected outcomes and a comparison between choices
(87, 98, 109). As the preclinical studies reviewed above show (48,
53), when an explicit choice between the drug and non-drug
reward options is available, the drug option is less likely to be
chosen; therefore, factors that increase the likelihood of engaging
deliberative processes or that increase the deliberative valuation
of a non-drug option should increase the efficacy of contingency
management.
6.1. Delay to Reward
Rewards that are only available in the future are less valuable than
rewards provided immediately (125–127) – something could hap-
pen between now and the time one expects to receive the reward
(thus diminishing the usefulness of that reward) and immediate
rewards can be invested (thus increasing the usefulness of imme-
diate rewards). The diminishing value of future rewards relative to
immediate rewards is quantifiably measurable through question-
naires in which subjects make decisions between immediate and
delayed amounts of money, drug, or both (121).
Drug users reliably show faster discounting rates than non-
addicts (128–132). Recovered addicts, however, show normal
discounting rates (128). Although this early study was unable
to determine whether this was a selection process in which the
addicts with more normal discounting rates responded better to
treatment, a more recent study has determined that successful
treatment has the effect of normalizing over-fast discounting
rates (133).
Many theoreticians have suggested that these preferences
for more immediately available rewards can drive drug use
because drugs provide very strong immediate rewards (eupho-
ria, relief from dysphoria) while abstinence provides only long-
term rewards (health, family, financial) (134, 135). Contingency
management may have the effect of bringing the long-term
rewards closer by providingmore proximal rewards for abstinence
(money, vouchers, draws from the prize-bowl).
Given the actual discounting rates reported in realistic subjects
(128, 130, 136), $2.50 for the first drug-negative sample would be
discounted quickly and seems unlikely to be able to deflect the
user away from drugs, especially in the beginning of contingency
management treatment. The delay-discounting rates that would
be necessary to make these small rewards provided at the end
of a week strong enough to affect decisions made days earlier
in the week are unreasonably slow (137, 138), particularly for
addicts, who have faster discounting rates than non-addicts [for
review, see Ref. (28)]. Studies have shown that individuals dis-
count smaller values more quickly than larger values [discounting
curves are steeper, Ref. (139)], which would further reduce the
discounted effectiveness of the small rewards provided early in
treatment.
Furthermore, both human and non-human subjects tend to
show hyperbolic discounting functions (121, 140, 141). Any
non-exponential (including hyperbolic) discounting function will
show preference reversals in which one choice is preferred when
both choices are far in the future, but the other becomes preferred
as the subject approaches the time of that second choice (142).
Thus, even if a user decided at the beginning of the week to prefer
the contingent reward ($2.50) to taking drugs, when faced with
the immediate choice, the user would seem likely to choose the
drug-use option.
During treatment in prize-based contingency management,
upon submission of a drug-negative sample, individuals immedi-
ately earn a chance to win a tangible prize. In addition, individuals
have a chance (albeit low in probability) to win a high-value prize
for every draw they earn. Thismeans that even though the average
overall value of reinforcers earned by subjects tends to be lower
in prize-based contingency management compared to voucher-
based contingency management, the availability of a more imme-
diate reward and the chance to win a high-value prize may cause
individuals to discount less. These differences in discounting rates
between the two versions of contingencymanagementmay help to
explain similar treatment efficacy evenwith differing value of total
potential reward.
6.2. Concreteness
The long-term rewards of abstinence tend to be more abstract
than the short-term reinforcement provided by drug use (135).
Several authors have suggested that the major difference between
immediate rewards and delayed rewards is the concreteness of
immediate rewards and the abstractness of delayed rewards (98,
143, 144).
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Trope and Liberman (143) suggest that high-temporal distance
creates difficult-to-conceptualize (high-level, more abstract) con-
struals that are more difficult to reason about, while low-temporal
distance creates easier-to-conceptualize (low-level, more con-
crete) construals. They hypothesize thatmore concrete options are
considered to bemore valuable thanmore abstract options. For an
addict, abstinence is a high-level construal placed in the hard-to-
imagine far future and is more abstract and less valuable than a
concrete reinforcer, such as the option to use drugs in the present
or near future, which is a low-level construal.
Current decision-making theories suggest that evaluating
future outcomes depends on constructing episodically-imagined
futures (87, 109, 113, 145). Kurth-Nelson and Redish (98)
suggested that discounting rates may depend on how difficult it is
for this construction process to find those potential future possi-
bilities. Supporting this hypothesis is evidence that fronto-parietal
areas are more active when people select the delayed option
(56, 57), that subjects with better working memory and
higher IQs tend to discount more slowly (115), and that
training working memory can slow discounting rates
(122, 133). Rewards placed in concrete episodic futures
(35AC on vacation in Paris next month) are discounted more
slowly than abstract future rewards (35AC next month) (146).
Kurth-Nelson and Redish (98) suggest that the decreased
discounting of concrete options is due to concrete futures being
easier to find and construct in the deliberative search process.
Taken together, these theories imply that more concrete
rewards have higher subjective value compared to abstract
rewards. What does this mean for addiction? Typically, an addict
has a choice betweenusing a drug andnot using a drug. The option
of using the drug has immediate and concrete rewarding effects.
Drug’s rewarding effects include subjective pleasurable effects and
relief from withdrawal, and both of these effects are expected
and concrete. The option of not using has immediate negative
effects (147), but the primary distal rewarding effects are very
abstract (135).
Contingency management changes this scenario by providing
the addict with a concrete reward (money, a voucher, a specific
prize) contingent upon abstinence, which is more proximal than
rewards for abstinence alone. This allows the addict to achieve the
goal of reducing drug consumption and increasing abstinence by
focusing, not on the abstract abstinence, but rather on the concrete
alternative.
This theory suggests that one effect of contingency manage-
ment is tomake both options immediate and concrete. The combi-
nation of the discounting/proximity and the concreteness theories
suggest that contingency management creates a situation where
the alternate reward (i.e., abstinence over drug use) is both more
concrete and closer in temporal distance; thus, making it more
equal to the drug-use option.
The importance of concreteness is highlighted by comparing
voucher- and prize-based treatments. Although subjects were
encouraged to imagine concrete items that the voucher could
be used for (5), in prize-based studies, the prizes are physically
present in a show-cabinet right there with the prize-bowl (9).
Vouchers were also useable for a variety of rewards, while winning
a given prize meant that that was the concrete prize you got.
Both voucher- and prize-based have been found to be similarly
effective, even though the value of possible earned rewards is
much lower in the prize-based studies (5, 9, 11, 12, 148). In both
versions, high-value rewards have been found to be more success-
ful than low-value rewards; however, the size of rewards offered
in these conditions differs considerably. Even though the total
value of possible rewards received in the high-value prize-based
method was lower than the low-value voucher-based method, the
high-value prize-based method was still effective for significantly
reducing drug consumption, while the low-value voucher-based
method was not. This not only exemplifies the importance of
value but also how the concreteness of the reward affects perceived
value. The presence of more concrete alternative rewards (specific
prizes) appears to have more of an effect than less concrete alter-
native rewards (voucher exchanged for money, in turn, used for
unspecified merchandise).
7. Conclusion and Further Discussion
In summary, we propose that contingency management’s success
occurs because it provides an alternate reinforcer that forces the
subject into a deliberative mode, which allows different valu-
ation processes than non-deliberative modes. It also provides
both a decreased time-to-reward and increased concreteness for
the alternate reward, which should increase the valuation of the
alternate reward relative to the valuation of the drug and move
the agent from a willingness-to-pay valuation mode to a choice
between/revealed-preference valuation mode.
7.1. Relationship to Classical Dual-Process
Theories
Many theoreticians have suggested that addiction arises from a
mismatch between the balance of two systems (typically called a
“hot” or impulsive system and a “cold,” rational system) (64, 149,
150). While it is possible to place our hypotheses for contingency
management within that two-system framework, we believe that
the evidence suggests that addiction is more complicated than the
simple out-of-balance theory proposes. Instead, we work from
the theory that continued drug use can arise from computation
errors in a number of placeswithin the decision-system, ofwhich a
mismatch in balance between systems is only one potential failure
mode (39, 43).
It is important to differentiate the vulnerabilities theory of
addiction that arises from the multiple action-selection-system
theory from the out-of-balance theory of addiction that arises
from the dual-process theory. (See Table 2 for a list of these
decision-concepts used in this paper.) Our proposal that contin-
gency management drives subjects toward deliberative processes
could follow from either of these two addiction/decision-making
theories, but the implications are different, depending on which
theory pertains.
The out-of-balance hypothesis of addiction is that addicts have
a problem with the balance between the two systems in the
dual-process theory (54, 55, 66, 67, 149). These systems can be
driven out of balance either from hyperactivity in the impul-
sive system or hypoactivity in the rational system (55, 56, 151,
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TABLE 2 | Economic theoretical constructs used in this article.
 Dual-process theory: the idea that there are two decision-making systems,
an impulsive system and a rational system
 Out-of-balance theory: the idea that addiction arises from an imbalance
between the impulsive and rational systems
 Multiple action-selection system theory: the idea that there are multiple
ways to select actions from information about the world (cues), history
(memory), and goals (needs/desires). Each of these systems is optimal in
different situations
 Vulnerabilities theory: the idea that addiction arises out of processing
failures in one or more of the action-selection systems
152). In either case, improving the strength of the rational sys-
tem [for example, by providing working memory training (122)
or by increasing activity in the prefrontal cortex (153)] should
decrease drug use because it should shift the balance toward the
more rational system. Our proposal that contingency manage-
ment drives decision-making toward deliberation implies that if
the dual-process and out-of-balance theories are correct, then
what contingency management is doing is shifting the balance
between these two systems. Evidence supporting this concept
was recently published by Wesley et al. (57), who found that
in an explicit cocaine-money choice, choosing money later over
cocaine now produced additional activity in the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex.
The vulnerabilities hypothesis of addiction is that there are
many potential “failuremodes” within these systems, any of which
can lead to addictive behaviors (39, 43, 77, 154). The concept
that there are many vulnerabilities implies that addiction can
arise from multiple causes. Our proposal that contingency man-
agement drives decision-making toward deliberation implies that
if the multiple-action-selection systems and vulnerabilities theo-
ries are correct, then what contingency management is doing is
twofold: (1) it is shifting the decision-making system into delibera-
tion because it is providing two choices, and (2) it is improving the
deliberation system algorithm, bymaking the goals more concrete
and more immediate.
There are similarities and differences between these theories.
Both theories include separate action-selection systems, only one
of which includes an explicit planning component.
 The concrete nature of the alternative reward in contingency
management is going to access that planning component,
driving behavior toward it.
 Under neither hypothesis is the alternative reward fast
enough to access the non-planning systems.
 In both theories, the planning-capable system depends on
cognitive resources and prefrontal cortex.
However, the vulnerabilities theory further proposes that there
are failure modes within the deliberative system as well, and thus
suggests that only a subset of patients will be helped by con-
tingency management, and that different aspects of contingency
management will help different patients.
 For patients who have vulnerabilities in the Pavlovian or
procedural systems who may express a desire to quit in the
absence of drug-related cues, but find themselves unable to
when faced with drug-related cues, contingency manage-
ment can provide a second option to attend to, even when
faced with drug-related cues, which can enable the delibera-
tive system to retain control. This likely relates to the differ-
ence in valuation between single-option choices (go/no-go,
willingness to pay) and dual-option choices (select between).
 For patients who have vulnerabilities in the evaluation step
of deliberative systems, the concrete nature of the alternative
reward in contingency management can make that reward
easier to locate in the search-through-the-future process.
This likely relates to the dependence of the search process
on episodic future thinking.
 For patients for whom the drugs are simply an alternative
reward option or for patients who have limited access to
alternative rewards (155), then the opportunity cost pro-
vided by contingencymanagement could be enough tomake
them reject the drug option.
 Because the vulnerabilities theory proposes that some
patients will have vulnerabilities within the deliberative
decision-making system [such as incorrect hypotheses about
consequences of their actions (156, 157)], these patients will
not be helped by contingencymanagement, at least until they
address those deliberative deficiencies.
7.2. Predictions and Implications
7.2.1. Identify Patients Capable of Deliberating
The idea that contingency management primarily accesses delib-
erative systems implies that it will be most successful in patients
with viable deliberative systems. This suggests that identifying
patients with intact deliberative systems would help identify
patients most likely to be helped by contingency management
programs. There are a number of cognitive tasks known to access
deliberative systems (94, 146, 158–161). Whether these tasks are
changed in addicts, however, remains unknown. The vulnera-
bilities theory predicts that some addicts will continue to show
deliberative abilities in these tasks, and that those addicts will be
best served by contingency management.
This hypothesis further suggests that patients with deficient
deliberative systems would be helped by first training those sys-
tems.Workingmemory training, for example, decreases discount-
ing rates as much as drug treatment (133).
7.2.2. Prediction: Contingency Management will
Depend on Prefrontal Integrity
The two hypotheses that contingency management depends on
deliberative processes and that deliberative processes depend on
prefrontal integrity predict that contingency management will be
most successful in patients with strongly active prefrontal systems.
Evidence that prefrontal cortical interactions with hippocampus
and other neural systems are a necessary component for delib-
erative decision-making processes is well-established (71, 94, 96,
145, 162, 163). For example, functional connectivity between
prefrontal cortex and nucleus accumbens predicts success in
drug-dependence treatment and an avoidance of relapse (152).
In rats, optogenetic stimulation of prelimbic (prefrontal) cortices
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decreases compulsive drug seeking, while optogentic inhibition
of prelimbic (prefrontal) cortices increased it (153). Similarly, in
humans, repetitive transcranialmagnetic stimulation (rTMS) over
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex reduced reported craving in
nicotine addicts (164).
It also suggests that patients with improved cognitive abilities
(115) and with prefrontal cortices more likely to play active roles
in decision-making (56, 57, 152) will be more capable of using
contingency management. These hypotheses imply that further
improvements in cognitive resources [such as with workingmem-
ory training (122, 133)] or increasing prefrontal activity (153) will
make patients bemore capable of using contingencymanagement.
7.2.3. Combine Contingency Management with
Working Memory Training and Cognitive
Reassessment Therapy
Contingencymanagement is often providedwith synergistic treat-
ment of pharmacological and sociological treatments (counsel-
ing, 12-step group work, methadone or nicotine-replacement
treatment, etc.) (1). While these additional treatments provide
potential rectification of decision-making vulnerabilities and fail-
ure modes, we suggest that they do not directly address the
reasons for the success of contingency management. Under the
hypothesis that contingencymanagement depends on deliberative
processes, improvements in those deliberative processes should
provide additional improvements in the success of contingency
management.
Deliberative decision-making entails the creation and imagi-
nation of hypothetical episodic futures and evaluation of those
futures (43, 85, 109, 111, 145). As such, it requires a search
process and memory to compare those evaluations (87, 98, 163).
Changes in the recognition of the underlying paths through those
futures affect the decisions made (138, 140, 165). For example,
the famous dictum that “there is no such thing as one drink for
an alcoholic” implies that decisions are not between drinking one
drink and not, but between drinking many drinks and not. This
process leads to bundling, in which future decisions are bundled
together, which changes the underlying valuation of those future
decisions (140, 165).
Changes in the ability to create, imagine, test, and remember
those futures will also likely increase the ability to engage that
deliberative system. It is possible to improve executive function
and working memory through training (122, 166). These proce-
dures decrease impulsivity as measured by discounting experi-
ments. Given the data that cognitive load decreases engagement
of the deliberative system (67, 124, 160), merely recognizing that
patients are particularly vulnerable under stress and situations
of increased cognitive load (165, 167), could suggest proactive
procedures (such as increased rewards or increased reminders)
during times of stress and cognitive load.
7.2.4. Increasing Value of the Alternate Option
From the very first introductions of contingency management,
it has been clear that providing an increased value of the alter-
nate rewards increases the success rate (1, 11, 148). This is a
straightforward prediction of the alternate reinforcement theory.
However, as expected from the discussion of the pre-clinical
data (above), dramatic changes would require very large alternate
rewards. For example, increasing the payout from $0.50 on the
first negative drug urine sample to $7.00 produces a significant
effect (168). Given the political difficulty of paying for drug treat-
ment programs, finding ways to increase the success of contin-
gency management without dramatically increasing costs would
be particularly useful. Prize-based contingency management is
one example of reducing costs without decreasing efficacy (1, 11).
7.2.5. Concrete Options are Discounted Less
than Abstract Options – Provide Reminders of
the Concrete Alternate Reward
If one could increase the proximity of the rewards at the moment
of decision, one could further increase the value of the alternative
option. Thus, one potential improvement would be to provide
a concrete reminder of the alternate reward (such as what the
current voucher value is) on an easily accessible place (such as a
smartphone app) that could be accessed at the actual moment of
decision.
Although concrete options are more valuable than abstract
options, symbolic reminders of concrete options might also
increase the value of alternate options. For example, simply stat-
ing a delayed reward will be delivered during an episodic event
decreases discounting and increases value relative to equivalent,
but less concrete rewards (146). Similarly, pictures of food rewards
are more valuable than text descriptions of those rewards (169).
Thus, visual symbols can improve both concreteness and delib-
eration. This suggests that providing the picture of the specific
concrete option being worked toward is likely to further improve
the reminder. Similarly, providing direct information about the
values of the alternative options (such as days clean, days remain-
ing to reward, points that would be lost due to relapsing) would
make it easier for the patient to evaluate the alternative outcome,
which shouldmake it easier for the patient to attend to (and select)
the alternative outcome. This could also be accomplished through
a smartphone app that shows the picture of the reward being
worked toward and information about the voucher points needed
to achieve that goal.
7.2.6. Preventing Relapse after Contingency
Management Treatment
As with any treatment, many patients relapse after treatment.
The vulnerabilities theory suggests that addiction is caused by
a multitude of potential failure modes (39, 43). Although con-
tingency management is a support mechanism that can aid in
a person’s recovery, other failure modes may still remain even
after completion of the contingencymanagement series. However,
contingency management can be combined with other treatments
(1, 5, 9). Studies have shown that the cognitive and discounting
impairments that arise during drug and alcohol use improve with
continued abstinence (133, 170–174). Thus, contingencymanage-
ment can create a span of time for an individual to repair these
failure modes, while also learning important skills to increase the
chance to remain abstinent in the future.
One potential solution would be to teach users to create their
own contingencymanagement process, providing their owndelib-
erative alternatives. Changes in expectations and representations
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of the outcomes of potential options can change decision-making
choices, even without changes in the underlying action-selection
processes (135, 138, 140).
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